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Emerging powers, state capitalism and the oil sector in Africa
Ian Taylora,b∗
aSchool of International Relations, University of St Andrews, St Andrews, UK; bDepartment of
Political Science, University of Stellenbosch, Stellenbosch, South Africa
The global development landscape is rapidly changing with the acceleration of the
economies of emerging countries and this has important implications for sub-Saharan
Africa (SSA). Notably, these emerging partners share a broad comparative advantage
in their outward engagement. They are able to access large pools of ﬁnance and
capital reserves and they also uphold a version of the Developmental State Model
that encourages a statist approach to business. This state capitalism is increasingly
coming to the fore, particularly in the aftermath of the global ﬁnancial crisis and the
evident intellectual collapse of neoliberalism as a sustainable economic model.
Keywords: state capitalism; oil; emerging powers
[Pouvoirs e´mergents, capitalisme d’E´tat et le secteur pe´trolier en Afrique.] Le paysage
mondial du de´veloppement change rapidement avec l’acce´le´ration des e´conomies des
pays e´mergents et ceci a des implications importantes pour l’Afrique subsaharienne
(ASS). En particulier, ces partenaires e´mergents partagent un avantage comparatif
large dans leur engagement vers l’exte´rieur. Ces pays ont acce`s a` des sources de
ﬁnancement mutualise´es et des re´serves de capital importantes, et ils maintiennent
aussi une version du mode`le d’E´tat de´veloppementiste qui encourage une approche
e´tatique des affaires. Ce capitalisme d’E´tat revient sur le devant de la sce`ne, en
particulier a` la suite de la crise ﬁnancie`re mondiale et l’effondrement manifeste au
niveau intellectuel du ne´olibe´ralisme comme un mode`le e´conomique durable.
Mots-cle´s : capitalisme de l’E´tat ; pe´trole ; pouvoirs e´mergents
The global development landscape is rapidly changing with the acceleration of the econom-
ies of emerging countries and this has important implications for sub-Saharan Africa (SSA).
As part of the broader structural process, Africa’s partnerships are diversifying, with signiﬁ-
cant increases in trade, investment, aid, etc, from a host of emerging partners such as Brazil,
China, India, South Korea and Turkey. However, the extent of these new developments is
often obscured by a focus on the ‘old’ relations of the ex-colonial powers and the United
States that has largely dominated Africa’s international relations since independence (see
Taylor 2010).
Obviously very few of these emerging partners are ‘new’ in Africa. Most in fact have a
long history of engagement with the continent. Thus the notion of ‘emerging partners’
needs to be conceptualised. Broadly, the term captures two key characteristics: they are con-
sidered ‘emerging’ economies in the global context; and their economic relations with SSA
have been largely marginal until the 10 years or so, but are rising fast and expected to grow.
Crucially, these ‘emerging partners’ are also countries which (with the exception of South
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Korea) do not belong to the club of traditional aid donors – the OECDDevelopment Assist-
ance Committee (DAC).
The increasing diversity of trading partners brings with it ostensibly new dimensions.
Each wave of countries engaging with the continent effects a new array of products,
capital goods, technology, know-how and development experience. Notably, these emer-
ging partners share a broad comparative advantage in their outward engagement as compa-
nies from these countries are often able to access large pools of ﬁnance and capital reserves
(mostly through state incentives and subsidised support). They also uphold a broadly statist
approach to business that enables private enterprise and mercantile commerce. This state
capitalism is increasingly coming to the fore, particularly in the aftermath of the global
ﬁnancial crisis.
State capitalism
In recent times, the global economy has seen a partial revival of the state’s role in the
economy, even whilst – paradoxically – neoliberalism remains the global hegemonic
project. Dirigisme is most obvious in some of the emerging economies outside of the capi-
talist heartland. State capitalism may be deﬁned as a mode of production that is ‘capitalist’
in the connotation of the presence of wage labour, extraction of proﬁts and market relations,
but which is distinctive in that there is a chief owner in the state, a degree of central planning
of production and/or investment and national goals expressed through long-run economic
development. For Grinder and Hagel, the core of the state capitalist class system is located
in the ﬁnance capitalists running the state-created central banking cartel and the command-
ing heights of the industrial economy most closely clustered around ﬁnance capital (Grinder
and Hagel 1977, 59–79). For economies outside of China, this is an attractive deﬁnition of
the class relations and linkages to the state capitalism practised in places such as Brazil,
India, South Korea, etc.
The phenomenon of state capitalism’s supposed rise has stimulated an excited debate in
the heartland regarding the possible rejection – or at least modiﬁcation – of the free market
gospel which has been so assiduously promoted as the generic economic solution. One
leading proponent in the debate, Ian Bremmer, has averred that ‘the state’s heavy hand
in the economy is signaling a strategic rejection of free-market doctrine’ (Bremmer
2009, 40), whilst others seem to believe that such a digression from the mantra of neoliber-
alism will lead to global contradictions. For instance, one source has argued that ‘state capit-
alism and resource nationalism are set to become two of the main economic issues of our
time’, implying a potential future clash (Lyons 2007). Bremmer also subscribes to the belief
that an immense struggle between state capitalists such as China and Russia and free-market
capitalists like the United States, European Union, Japan and Canada is likely to stake out
the future (Bremmer 2010). Emblematically, a summit organised by Harvard Business
School which brought together chief executives from some of the world’s leading corpor-
ations, identiﬁed state capitalism as among the 10 most signiﬁcant threats to market capit-
alism (Bower, Leonard, and Paine 2011).
Typically, The Economist ran a special issue on ‘The rise of state capitalism’, complete
with a picture of Lenin holding a cigar (The Economist (London), 21 January 2012),
absurdly suggesting that any deviation from neoliberal orthodoxy leads straight to revolu-
tion. The Economist went on to darkly warn that ‘Ensuring that trade is fair is harder when
some companies enjoy the support, overt or covert, of a national government’, conveniently
forgetting the massive subsidies, tariff and non-tariff barriers plus innumerable other
support that contemporary Western governments provide to their national companies. Of
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course, The Economist gets it all wrong in portraying state capitalism as a step towards
socialism. As Lenin (1977, 440) wrote:
Socialism is inconceivable without large-scale capitalist engineering based on the latest discov-
eries of modern science. It is inconceivable without planned state organisation, which keeps
tens of millions of people to the strictest observance of a uniﬁed standard in production and
distribution . . . At the same time socialism is inconceivable unless the proletariat is the ruler
of the state.1
This is hardly the case in any emerging country that practises elements of state capitalism
today.
Returning to The Economist and its attack on state capitalism and the evils of public
support, as Chomsky (2005) noted:
Concentrated private power strongly resists exposure to market forces, unless it’s conﬁdent it
can win in the competition. That goes back centuries... Protectionist devices, such as those of
NAFTA and the WTO, are only a fraction of the means by which the wealthy and powerful
protect themselves from market forces. In fact, the core of the ‘new economy’ is based on
the principle that cost and risk should be socialised, and proﬁt privatised (often after
decades in the dynamic state sector).
As economic history demonstrates, that is precisely what was involved in the British adop-
tion of ‘free trade’ in the nineteenth century, once a global commercial empire had been
constructed using a vigorous form of mercantilism, often using military might as enforce-
ment. Only once competitors (such as the Indian textile trade) had been eliminated and
market advantage established, did the British elites then convert to the beneﬁts of
laissez-faire. Prior to this, mercantilism reigned whereby ‘the Mercantile System was a
system of state-regulated exploitation through trade which played a highly important rule
in the adolescence of capitalist industry’ (Dobb 1964, 209). Indeed the advice to follow
pure ‘free market’ polices was ‘contrary to the lessons of virtually the whole of economic
history since the Industrial Revolution . . . every country which . . . moved into . . . strong
sustained growth . . . has done so in outright violation of pure, free-market principles’
(Ormerod 1994, 63).
This is all curiously forgotten in the West when advancing ‘free markets’ as the devel-
opment policy of choice (indeed, necessity) for Africa.
Yet contrary to The Economist and its hysteria, state capitalism is hardly revolutionary.
Instead, it ‘represents an effort to correct or overcome inadequacies in the functioning of the
private sector, for the society, rather than an effort to transform social relations of pro-
duction within the society (that is, class relations)’ (Duvall and Freeman 1981, 104). The
state capitalist model(s) provide subsidies, privileges and other interventions in the
market to favoured classes. Such an economy consumes resources or factors at a higher
and more intensive rate than would be possible if large private corporations were covering
the input costs themselves. It is also largely more capital-intensive, and more contingent on
scientiﬁc-technical expertise and labour, certainly than would be economical if all invest-
ment expenditure on R&D were shouldered by the corporate recipients. But these and
other factors give the model(s) a powerfully competitive edge, particularly with regard to
granting late capitalism somewhat of an advantage when contending with more mature
economies. In the West, dominated as it is by neoliberalism, the debate regarding state
capitalism habitually transmits strong negative undertones (Haber 2002; Kang 2002). In
this discourse, state intervention in the economy is, by deﬁnition, abusive and distortionary.
Review of African Political Economy 343
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What is interesting about this debate with regard to the emerging powers is that the
current critical discourse ﬂattens out the diversity of different state capitalist models. In
fact, other than phenomenal economic performance, the emerging powers have consider-
able differences between them, not least with regard to the question of governance.
Clearly, China and Russia practise an authoritarian top-down form of government (even
if only aspirationally) whilst states such as Brazil, India, South Korea etc. are more or
less established liberal democracies, with an attendant political culture. And although the
state plays an important role in the national political economy in these countries, they all
differ in their particular models of state-business exchanges. As a result, we must talk of
variations of state capitalism.
In their work on varieties of state capitalisms, Aldo Musacchio and Sergio Lazzarini
(2012) propose a stylised distinction between two broad, general forms of state capitalism
that may be observed in the emerging powers. The ﬁrst model is the Leviathan as a majority
investor, where state-owned enterprises (SOEs), development banks, state-owned holding
companies are common, maybe dominant. The second model is the Leviathan as a minority
investor where minority investments by development banks, pension funds, sovereign
wealth funds and the state itself predominate. These two organisational modes of state capit-
alism vary across time and space, but what is important is that they offer up alternative
economic prototypes that have a powerful attraction in Africa where three decades of neo-
liberal restructuring lays exhausted and, after the global economic crisis and the palpable
empirical rise of states that practise state capitalism, Western prescriptions for development
ring hollow.
Neoliberalism’s resilience
However, here we need some caution before celebrating the actual end of neoliberalism.
Whilst the ﬁnancial crisis has certainly raised consciousness of the ethics regarding ﬁnan-
cial accountability and state regulation and the wisdom of increased control of the global
economy, the actual philosophical underpinnings of neoliberalism remain largely intact,
even whilst state capitalist models appear attractive. David Harvey’s argument that neoli-
beralism must be seen as a class project, camouﬂaged by a neoliberal rhetoric about indi-
vidual rights and freedom and personal responsibility being exempliﬁed in privatisation and
the free market is apposite here (Harvey 2009). In restoring capitalist class power, neoliber-
alism has been reasonably successful and current state responses to the ongoing global
crisis, particularly in the West, are likely to persist in this achievement. The mass bailouts
for example may be seen as a demonstration of state power protecting ﬁnancial institutions
at all costs, and resolving the crisis – but for the capitalist class only (ibid.).
Actual structural change in terms of governance or developmental policies has not
really transpired. Instead, a problem-solving attitude dominates, focused on ‘ﬁxing’
rather than replacing the status quo. This may also be said to characterise current
ongoing debates on questions of global governance, which are ‘Essentially problem-
solving activities committed to promoting the smooth functioning of the inter-state
system [and have] the effect of assisting the reproduction of the very structures which
many political actors regard as unjust’ (Linklater 1998, 21). For many analysts, this is pre-
cisely what has happened. Chakravartty and Schiller (2010, 685) for instance argue that the
unreformed international ﬁnancial institutions (IFIs) ‘continue their emphasis on neoliberal
austerity, the policy that helped to foster the crisis in the ﬁrst place’, as they concentrate on
trying to put the broken fragments back together again. Yet fundamentally this is about
retaining privilege:
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It must be stressed that the beneﬁciaries of the political means in a market oriented economy are
dependent on the existence of the economic means in order to survive and prosper . . . In view
of the dependence of the political means on the economic means, the optimal strategy for the
political class to pursue will not be to maximize short-term returns, but rather to promote as
productive a system as possible, consistent with the preservation of its exploitative position
within that system. (Grinder and Hagel 1977, 67)
It is quite obvious that the state capitalist emerging economies are structurally integrated
into the ongoing world order under the hegemony of neoliberal capitalism. They do not rep-
resent a different or alternative order, other than one where these arrivistes are incorporated
as notional equals. The BRICS concept itself was, as Desai (2007, 785) points out:
. . . more than a narrative about the sources of new growth in the world economy: it was a direc-
tive to ﬁrst world political and corporate leaders about where new opportunities lay and another
to third world political and corporate leaders about the conditions – mainly consistency of neo-
liberal policy – they must secure if the fruits foreseen were to be theirs.
Any cultural or historical differences that may exist between the BRICS and the ‘traditional’
powers plays but a secondary role in determining their basic posture and interests, which in
itself is shaped and constructed by the necessities of capital. This should be palpably
obvious. After all, in the evolutionary development of Western capitalism, all manner of
national differences have been acculturated into accepting certain norms and standards
(most notably why ‘the West’ includes Japan).
Indeed, the global marketisation and commodiﬁcation project is likely to receive a boost
from the way the emerging economies are being incorporated into the capitalist world
market, particularly states such as China. In the West the neoliberal policy framework
remains dominant. The severe austerity packages being imposed in and by the heartland
demonstrates this. Yet the rise of the emerging economies may be seen as signiﬁcant
steps forward in the broadening of global capitalism, intensifying the creation of a
system of global circuits of capital accumulation. In this process, national states have an
evolving but continuing role in which they are oriented and supported by ever more inter-
locked networks of global institutions (Cammack 2006). The global expansion of economic
interests from these state capitalist economies continues to intensify the global commodi-
ﬁcation process. But whatever conﬂicts and debates that may emerge between the
BRICS and the capitalist heartland are of an inter-capitalist nature, within the broader hege-
monic order. As Tucker (1893, 75) notes, ‘the State [still] exists mainly to do the will of
capital and secure it all the privileges it demands.’
Conceptually, competition is nothing other than the inner nature of capital, its essential char-
acter, appearing in and realized as the reciprocal interaction of many capitals with one
another, the inner tendency [presents itself] as external necessity. Capital exists and can only
exist as many capitals, and its self-determination therefore appears as their reciprocal inter-
action with one another. (Marx 1973, 414–415)
Marx’s analysis demonstrates that capital exists as private discrete centres of accumulation
but which are driven by inter-capitalist competition. This is why, in its quest to expand and
reproduce, capital is continuously opening up new spaces for proﬁtability – and why
investment banks such as Goldman Sachs are eager to identify and promote these new
centres of accumulation and investment.
Yet it cannot be denied that post-crisis and in tandem with the rise of the emerging
powers, alternative governance and developmental models are at least being debated.
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Despite neoliberalism being hegemonic in recent decades, the variegated nature of actually
existing capitalisms under conditions of free market orthodoxy belies any one strict appli-
cation of an ideal type. Varied in institutional form and spatially differentiated, ‘neoliberal-
ism’ in fact is refracted in different forms, such as the welfare-centred continental European
model or the Asian state capitalism which integrate capital, the state and subordinated
labour (O’Brien and Williams 2004, 130). This existing space with regard to policy has
been arguably ampliﬁed post-crisis.
Emerging powers, who are widely seen to have brought inﬂation under control,
developed greater trade and ﬁnancial linkages among themselves (which then contribu-
ted to their buoyancy as a group), and diversiﬁed their productive bases and export pro-
ﬁles appear as alternative models to the much-resented Northern-inspired economic
projects. Recognition of how the ﬁnancial crisis played out differentially across the
globe and the relative resilience of the emerging powers’ economies in comparison to
the North’s has had a powerful effect on some thinking within Africa and where best
the continent’s future lies in terms of strategic engagement. This is then tied to a
rethinking vis-a`-vis Africa’s continued traditional ties to the North even if this is, at
minimum, a realisation that other worlds exist beyond the North–South axis. An inter-
esting milieu is thus established as the context for the ongoing resurgence of interest in
the continent.
Africa’s oil extraction and state capitalist corporations
Africa has now emerged as a major site for competition between various oil corporations
from diverse nations (see Clarke 2008; Ghazvinian 2007; Yates 2012). A number of
these corporations come from states operating varieties of the state capitalist model.
Whilst this is not solely a race between Chinese and American corporations, competitive
dynamics are heavily inﬂuenced by the roles and activities of actors from these two
states, as well as other emerging powers (Frynas and Paulo 2007, 230). Policy-makers in
various states have identiﬁed African oil as vital to their respective nations’ national inter-
ests and so are actively encouraging their oil corporations (be they private or state-owned)
to enter into the African markets (see Carmody 2011; Southall and Melber 2009). This is
obviously easier to do for state capitalist nations which own signiﬁcant equity in the
national oil corporations.
However, unlike the colonial Scramble for Africa, African agency is far more present in
the contemporary rush for Africa’s oil, creating an environment which is more challenging
for the oil companies to secure contracts (Arnold 2009). Many African governments are
quite proactive in their roles within today’s context and whilst we might agree that the nine-
teenth century Scramble ‘was driven and dictated by European colonial interests’, currently
‘African leaders act in the role of decision-makers’ (Frynas and Paulo 2007, 235). Whilst it
is true that many African states are rich in oil but lack sufﬁcient capital to exploit these
resources and thus create formative conditions whereby African elites might be seen as
dependent upon external actors to facilitate exploitation (Goel 2004, 482), the ability of
the government to negotiate favourable contracts should not be discounted. Of course,
the determination of extant elites to maintain the status quo as compradors in charge of
rentier states, reproducing dependence on the collection of externally realised oil rents
means that hope for any progressivism from that direction is probably misplaced (see
Turner 1980).
Many oil-rich African governments are quite skilful in playing the oil game – albeit for
the beneﬁt of the incumbent elites, rather than the broad masses, in what has been dubbed
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the ‘dirty politics of African oil’ (Shaxson 2007). In Angola for example, the state-owned
oil company, Sonangol, is:
. . . an entity that can articulate state interests in the oil sector with comparative prowess, bring-
ing together its scarce human resources and enabling success in negotiations and joint ventures
as well as access to oil-backed loans: in short, Sonangol. Insulated from the rest of the state
apparatus and the incompetence of the civil service, conversant in the languages of high
ﬁnance, business contracts and oil technology, Sonangol is a strange marriage of the latest
expertise and market savvy with the narrow enrichment goals of a failed state leadership,
and it works. (Soares de Oliveira 2007, 610–611)
This reality is one in which oil corporations of whatever national origin must navigate –
albeit it appears that some are more skilled at doing so than others.
Currently, more than 70% of world oil reserves and an even greater percentage of the
residual reserves of ‘easy oil’ are controlled by national oil companies. State-owned
national oil companies have progressively enlarged their share of the world’s oil
resources, as well as expanding into and developing major gas ﬁelds. These national
oil companies are powerful organisations operating within the state capitalism model
whilst increasingly leveraging greater managerial autonomy and decision-making
powers. This is primarily because these corporations are ever more demanded by the
state to generate proﬁts and operate on a commercially viable platform. In doing so,
many of the national oil corporations are reinventing themselves away from being
state-dominated, bureaucratic objects often enmeshed into wider patronage systems of
political favours and appointments and that have relied on a constructed domestic mono-
polistic position answerable only to the government of the day. The broad move is
towards at least partially privatised entities with resultant changes in their corporate
and managerial procedures. This obviously varies from country to country, corporation
to corporation, but what is apparent is that these national oil corporations have been
well placed to take advantage of the post-1990s deepening of globalisation, where sole
access to oil reserves in newly emergent oilﬁelds has made state-owned corporations
from the South important actors in the oil market.
Known as the ‘Seven Sisters’, Anglo-Persian Oil (now BP), Gulf Oil, Standard Oil of
California (SoCal), Texaco (now Chevron), Royal Dutch Shell, Standard Oil of New Jersey
(Esso) and Standard Oil of New York (now ExxonMobil) dominated the global petroleum
industry from the mid 1940s to the 1970s (Sampson 1975). This has dramatically changed
and global production is now increasingly organised by state-owned companies from devel-
oping countries who have increasingly started to engage in overseas investment. This
process began with the creation of the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC) and a wave of nationalisations across the post-colonial world.
This growth of state-owned oil companies has accentuated competition in the oil
industry, particularly as companies headquartered in developing economies are now
more aggressively seeking out overseas investment activity. As a result, a number of
the national oil corporations have enlarged their businesses globally, diversifying their
geographic ﬁeld of operations and also developing greater downstream capabilities,
such as developing petrochemical industries, investing in reﬁneries and improving their
distribution capacities to access the global market more exactly. A privileged access to
capital and technology are key dynamics behind these endeavours and are, as remarked
above, intrinsic to some aspects of the state capitalist model. In Africa, these dynamics
are being played out with the ongoing activities of national oil corporations from some
of the emerging powers.
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This process is taking place within the wider context where globally, at least 80% of oil
reserves are under the control of national governments, whilst fully three-quarters of the 20
largest oil companies are state-owned. Just as there are varieties of state capitalism, there are
varieties of national oil corporations. Crudely, they can be divided into those that have a
steady and reliable source of capital and those that lack this. The ﬁrst type generally
operate pretty much as the publicly traded private oil companies do, seeking crude oil on
the global market and keeping most of the income post-tax and other diversions (such as
paying out dividends to the government or shareholders the royalties. Companies such as
CNOOC (China), Petrobras (Brazil), Petronas (Malaysia), Sonangol (Angola) and Sona-
trach may be included in this group, able to source ﬁnance to develop their own projects
without having to incur loans or attract investors.
Furthermore, state-owned oil companies are subject to quite different commercial
models than many privately owned companies, which dominate the West’s oil industry.
Being state-owned, they possess comparatively limited short-term proﬁt constraints, are
able to draw on reserves and production outputs over the rate of return, enjoy the beneﬁts
of being part of a bigger state-supported framework and generally have the beneﬁt of
limited regulation, in comparison to their Western counterparts. The classic, but by no
means unique, example of these ongoing developments is the role of Chinese oil companies
in Africa.
Chinese national oil corporations
China’s oil industry has experienced signiﬁcant restructuring as domestic needs have
become ever more pressing (Andrews-Speed, Dow, and Gao 2000). The Chinese govern-
ment rationalised most state-owned fuel operations in 1998, placing them under the regu-
latory oversight of the State Energy Administration. In the oil sector speciﬁcally, Beijing
restructured two ﬁrms, namely the CNPC and Sinopec, both of which emerged as vertically
integrated oil and petrochemical corporations with interests that stretched across the whole
value chain. CNPC, which had mostly been involved in the exploration of oil and gas ﬁelds,
production (the upstream aspect of the industry) soon accounted for 66% of China’s oil and
gas output and 42% of its reﬁning capacity. Sinopec, which had formerly focused on reﬁn-
ing and delivery, made up 23% of oil output, 11% of gas output, and 54% of reﬁning
capacity (Nolan and Zhang 2002, 21). Both companies are now major players in the
world oil industry, more or less involved in all aspects of exploration and production.
CNOOC, incorporated in 1982, conducts offshore exploration and production operations
(see Jaffe and Lewis 2002). All three companies continue to be state owned, although
the administrative functions of CNPC and Sinopec have been divided from their
business-management tasks.
The State Petroleum and Chemical Industry Bureau was established under the State
Economic and Trade Commission to assume the administration functions of CNPC and
Sinopec. Reﬂecting a relative openness to policy advice, the CIIS regularly brings aca-
demics together with business, military, and government leaders to devise strategies for
the country; as a result, ‘Beijing has been encouraging representatives of state-controlled
companies to secure exploration and supply agreements with states that produce oil, gas,
and other resources’ (Zweig and Bi Jianhai 2005, 27).
According to Zha Daojiong (2006, 182), ‘It is hard to tell whether a particular overseas oil
or gas venture is the result of the Chinese government directing its state-owned energy
company or the domestic energy industry seeking diplomatic assistance from the government,
since for over a decade China has lacked a central ministerial agency overseeing the industry.’
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This dilemma further reﬂects the heterogeneity of contemporary China and the need for
caution in talking of a ‘Chinese strategy’ in Africa, especially with respect to sensitive
areas such as energy. At best, we can say that there are certain tactics associated with
China’s national oil companies and their activities in Africa; obvious examples are the acqui-
sition of foreign-energy resources via long-term contracts and of equity investments overseas
in order to circumvent overreliance on the open global oil market through either actually
acquiring stakes in Africa’s oilﬁelds or safeguarding access. Africa is a prime site because,
according to CICIR’s Chen Fengying, ‘China confronts foreign competition. Chinese compa-
nies must go to places for oil where [US] and European companies are not present’ (Washing-
ton Post, 22 December 2004). Indeed, this is a central aspect of the national oil companies’
strategy in Africa. Entering markets from which Western oil corporations are excluded (such
as that of Sudan) is another important tactic. Still another is to ‘link access to acreage [with]
state-backed ﬁnancial deals, where[by] acreage is provided in return for soft credit used to
purchase Chinese goods and services’ (Tjønneland et al. 2006, 30). This approach has
been used in a number of African countries, including Angola and Nigeria. Forming strategic
alliances with the national oil companies of Angola, Nigeria, and Sudan in order to gain
access to oilﬁelds has also worked for Chinese corporations, as has outbidding competitors,
though the latter ‘is a risky strategy, as it requires the oil price to remain high for the invest-
ments to be proﬁtable’ (Tjønneland et al. 2006, 30).
Arguably, Chinese companies saw the opportunities in Africa before other actors did
(see Taylor 2009). The latter’s concern over the scale of China’s activities on the continent
reﬂects the general ambivalence of many Western commentators about the rise of post-
Maoist China as well as of other developing nations such as India: ‘On the one hand, the
desire to exploit the vast market that is developing in China is irresistible to global capital-
ists. On the other, they fear not only [China’s] economic power, but the political and mili-
tary might that is rapidly growing with it’ (Weil 2006, 23). The literature on modern China
aimed at popular audiences echoes such fears; compare, for instance, James McGregor’s
One billion customers (2005) to The gathering threat by Bill Gertz and Constantine
Menges (2005) and The coming China wars by Peter Navarro (2006). As the title suggests,
the topic of Western confusion is central to Hugo De Burgh’s China: friend or foe? (2006).
Criticism by Western sources is perhaps compounded by the very nature of the national
oil companies. Because they are state owned, they are able to expand their activities in
Africa even at the risk of paying over the odds in order to outbid competitors. Consider
the description by one analyst of such manoeuvres:
Chinese [national oil companies] . . . are not primarily answerable to public shareholders with
short time horizons. They are not overwhelmed by fear of failure. Indeed, they have not had to
face major commercial crises. Thus they can afford, or think they can afford, to take a more
optimistic view of technical, commercial, and political risks. Indeed, close support from the
Chinese government may . . . lower the political risk in some countries. This lower level of per-
ceived risk, combined with access to loans from state-owned commercial banks, will result in
China’s companies having a lower cost of capital than international oil companies. (Xin Ma and
Andrews-Speed 2006, 9)
What this means in practical terms is that state-backed companies may be prepared to evalu-
ate projects that private-owned international oil companies would not touch. However,
‘What is not clear from the outside is which examples of “overbidding” are the result of
deliberate strategy and which are the result of inexperience’ (ibid.).
It is however clear that China’s national oil companies take the long-term view rather
than the short-term view of private Western companies necessitated by considerations of
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proﬁts and shareholders (see Taylor 2006). China’s corporations who practise such logic
have a distinct advantage over their Western competitors.
State capitalism, oil and competition
The methods for pursuing African oil contracts vary between Western and national oil cor-
porations owned by states. This may be said to be observable in three key areas. Firstly, in
addition to proposing ﬁnancial compensation, state-owned corporations may involve their
national governments in offering physical developmental support in the form of infrastruc-
ture, aid projects and technology transfer. Secondly, most national oil corporations do not
have the same sort of political and developmental constraints that Western companies are
supposed to conform to, such as environmental standards, labour rights, etc. These are
often legal requirements that Western companies must fulﬁl. Thirdly, many national oil
companies have different goals than private Western companies, stemming from the
reality that they are nationalised and so do not have private shareholders, at least not in
the majority.
Quite often, oil companies from state capitalist systems have lower labour costs, stiff
proﬁt margins and rapid project completion. For instance, whereas Western corporations typi-
cally require a rate of return of between 15 and 25%, state-owned companies (Chinese
corporations are a good example here) may be prepared to work on a tight margin of less
than 10%, even lower. The ability of some national oil companies to outbid competitors
for African contracts gives them a strong competitive edge. Chinese corporations, for
example, are after long-term energy security, contrasted to the short-range goals most
Western private companies must meet to satiate shareholders. This long-term perspective
may also make state-owned ﬁrms less risk averse, with political motivations trumping the
concerns of private investors.
However, it does appear that on occasions it is the national origin of a company, rather
than its ownership status, that is decisive. For example, in 2006 CNOOC’s acquisition of a
working interest in a deep-water area of the Niger Delta was approved. The deal included
the lucrative Akpo oil ﬁeld, which was discovered in 2000. The Akpo ﬁeld is said to hold
700 million barrels of crude-oil reserves as well as gas reserves of about 2.5 trillion cubic
feet (This Day, 9 January 2006). CNOOC also took over the commitments of the original
contractor of OPL 246, buying a 45% working interest in the deep-water block for US$2.3
billion plus an adjustment of US$424 million for other expenses. The former amount will
ﬁnance the NNPC’s 50% equity stake in OPL 246; CNOOC will then garner 70% of proﬁt
oil from the ﬁeld, while the NNPC takes the remaining 30%, as well as 80% of cost oil. In
winning the contract, CNOOC beat India’s biggest oil company, the state-owned Oil and
Natural Gas Corporation, which had put in a US$2 billion bid in January 2006 only to
see the Indian government blocking the deal on the grounds that it was not commercially
feasible. What is interesting here is that the Indian government also deemed OPL 246,
which was mired in controversy surrounding the ownership by well-connected former gov-
ernment ofﬁcials of assets in the billions, too risky.
Unlike ‘traditional’ Western bidding on oil concessions, the state-owned national cor-
porations may offer more than simple ﬁnancial inducements. China, for example, is said
to pursue the ‘Angolan model’. This is where ﬁnancing arrangements (often backed by
China EXIM Bank) links a commodity off-take contract with the delivery of certain infra-
structure projects. The neologism is so named because EXIM Bank’s ﬁrst main agreement
to deliver on such a premise was with Angola in March 2004 when the ﬁrst $2 billion
ﬁnancing package was agreed with Luanda, under which ﬁnancing was pledged to
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support in the construction of Angola’s infrastructure in areas such as energy, education,
health and transport. This supposed model often lubricates bids as it connects investment
with infrastructure loans for either the refurbishment of existing infrastructure that have
fallen into abeyance, or for new projects that may not necessarily be viable on strictly
private commercial terms – yet nonetheless are vitally needed by the host country
concerned. Typically, the Angola model delivers loans at minimal interest rates, sometimes
reconciled with natural resource delivery.
Whilst not pursuing the Angola model per se, the Indian government has started to set
aside ﬁnances to establish soft loans to create logistics and infrastructure facilities as a foun-
dation to acquiring mineral assets. Examples would include Eritrea, Ethiopia, the Demo-
cratic Republic of Congo, and Ghana, where New Delhi has identiﬁed viability in
acquiring contracts for fertiliser mineral assets such as potash and rock phosphate. An
Indian ofﬁcial was quoted as stating that ‘It is very difﬁcult to successfully gain access
to overseas mineral assets, particularly in Africa, without long-term bilateral economic
engagements. The model adopted by China has been very successful. Chinese companies
invest heavily in infrastructure and logistics before gaining concessions for minerals. India
needs to adopt a similar approach’ (Das 2012). Consequently, in mid 2012 the Indian gov-
ernment proposed to spend $1 billion between 2012 and 2017 through state-owned fertiliser
companies to establish commitments in Africa. Subsequently, the corpus would be augmen-
ted to fund mineral asset acquisitions. Though the state-controlled fertiliser companies have
no experience in mining, it does demonstrate that the modus operandi pursued by China has
been deemed to be successful in acquiring leverage in minerals acquisition in Africa and
New Delhi plans to pursue a similar strategy. This is only feasible in the context of a
broad state capitalist framework and arguably gives those companies operating under
these norms a possible competitive edge over the privatised operations found in most
Western companies.
Conclusion
It is obvious that appropriating the development opportunities that receipts from natural
resources grant is not clear-cut. Africa’s past is replete with examples where windfall
gains from oil have not been utilised for the common good and in the service of broad-
based sustainable development. Furthermore, the reproduction of the continent’s depen-
dency on primary commodities is hardly something to be celebrated. As state capitalism
is a class project, a continuation – rather than a break – from the past is likely to occur.
The state-owned corporations have thus far demonstrated a lack of interest in the govern-
ance of the states where they have invested, which is highly redolent of their Western
counterparts. In fact, few of the largest national oil companies, particularly from the emer-
ging economies, are committed to relevant international initiatives that might foster best
practice, such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative and the Voluntary Prin-
ciples on Security and Human Rights. As the emerging economies become more and
more important and their state-owned corporations make a bigger impact globally, until
these companies engage with established international commitments, the impact of these
initiatives will be reduced.
On a different note, it is interesting that dirigiste economies are expanding rapidly under
conditions of the global hegemony of neoliberalism and the principle of ‘open’ markets.
This is somewhat of a contradiction. Whilst actively supporting and developing national
state-owned corporations and encouraging them to go global in the search for investment
opportunities and export markets, the state capitalist countries are only able to do so
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under the broader umbrella of a liberal trading regime, however imperfect this may be in
reality. This explains why the state capitalist emerging economies are not advocating any
structural change in the global economy, but rather pushing for their greater incorporation
into the world economy, albeit on slightly renegotiated lines where liberalisation is insti-
tuted across the board, including in the West. It is this urgency to expose the hypocrisy
of the North in its calculated push for free trade in the South – whilst keeping various of
its own markets closed to Southern competition – that impels elements in the South to
engage with the North rather than confront them. The whole BRICS project is emblematic
in this regard. State capitalist models have been remarkably successful in taking full advan-
tage of globalised liberal markets and certainly do not want this ediﬁce crashing down. The
contemporary period is characterised by an interesting mix whereby neoliberalism is the
hegemonic ideology vis-a`-vis economic organisation at the global level, yet space still
exists for state capitalist models to ﬂourish. ‘What is above all new about this development
is the outward-looking, economically expansionist (rather than protectionist) nature of this
new ‘statist’ capitalism with often state-owned or state-controlled multinationals (such as
national oil companies) or Sovereign Wealth Funds expanding on a global scale, integrating
themselves into transnational circuits of capitalist production and ﬁnance, while still to
some extent retaining their state-dependent nature’ (Van Apeldoorn and Overbeek 2012,
15). These regimes accept the mantra of liberal globalisation, although they argue that
this system is currently heavily weighted in favour of the North and needs redressing.
Yet within Africa, the beneﬁts of state support for many emerging economies’ corporations
in their strategic engagement with the continent is apparent. Here, it is quite clear that such
corporations are beating many of the Western companies at their own game and enjoy
support and protection from their home governments in this competition. This has a
certain irony to it and accounts for the negative response (and caricaturisation) of state
capitalism as being intrinsically wrong-headed and a threat to global order.
The state capitalist countries are engaged in practices that marked out the now estab-
lished economies when the predecessors of the great Western-based transnational corpor-
ations ﬁrst began commercial operations in Africa. As economic history clearly
demonstrates, it was only after these mercantilist operations had captured markets and
destroyed potential competitors that the call (in fact, demand – often using force or the
threat thereof) for laissez-faire became state policy. Using ‘aggressive colonialism and pro-
tective legislation, [ensuring commercial supremacy in foreign markets and] industrial pre-
dominance’ (Wrightson 2000, 11), the West only slowly came round to the alleged virtues
of a liberal order. The modern ‘world market’ was not produced by free market forces: it
was a synthetic invention by states established under conditions created by European
imperialism. Friedrich List, the nineteenth-century German economist, noted that ‘It is a
very common clever device that when anyone has attained the summit of greatness, he
kicks away the ladder by which he has climbed up, in order to deprive others of the
means of climbing up after him. In this lies the secret of the cosmopolitical doctrine of
Adam Smith’ (List 1841, 295–296). List goes on to note that ‘Any nation which by
means of protective duties and restrictions on navigation has raised her manufacturing
power and her navigation to such a degree of development that no other nation can
sustain free competition with her, can do nothing wiser than to throw away these ladders
of her greatness, to preach to other nations the beneﬁts of free trade, and to declare in peni-
tent tones that she has hitherto wandered in the paths of error, and has now for the ﬁrst time
succeeded in discovering the truth’ (ibid.).
Clearly, critics of state capitalism such as The Economist ignore the role of the state in
the construction and preservation of the capitalist economy. Neoliberals seem to see the
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state merely as a burden on the ‘free’ operations of the market and a medium for imposing
socialism. This view demonstrates willful historical ignorance and a class project: ‘The
de-legitimation of the state is central to the ideological deconstruction of post-colonial
nationalism as the state continues to be the locus of resistance to world market subordina-
tion . . . The more ‘alien’ the state can be made to appear the less legitimate is its pretence to
represent the nation’ (Beckman 1993, 23). It is axiomatic that global capitalism and the
nineteenth century Scramble for Africa would never have triumphed without the bourgeois
state (Rodney 1970).
All capitalist nations have depended on the apparatus of the state to generate and uphold
the political and legal environments necessary for capitalism. ‘Laissez- faire theories, which
always regarded the state as a dysfunctional factor in the conduct of economic affairs [have]
reassert[ed] themselves again in the current terminology of globalisation. The facts are,
however, that nation states always faced economic challenges and usually overcame
them (of course with different degrees of success in different countries and periods)’
(Levi-Faur 1997, 171). With regard to the foremost imperialist nation, from which one
of the most trenchant critiques of mercantilism came:
The political purpose of [Adam Smith’s] the Wealth of nations was to attack the mercantilist
institutions that the British economy had built up over the previous two hundred years. Yet
in proposing institutional change, Smith lacked a dynamic historical analysis. In his attack
on these institutions, Smith might have asked why the extent of the world market available
to Britain in the late eighteenth century was so uniquely under British control. If Smith had
asked this ‘big question’, he might have been forced to grant credit for Britain’s extent of
the world market to the very mercantilist institutions he was attacking. [Moreover, he] might
have recognised the integral relation between economic and political power in the rise of
Britain to international dominance. [Overall], [w]hat the British advocates of laissez-faire neg-
lected to talk about was the role that a system of national power had played in creating con-
ditions for Britain to embark on its dynamic development path . . . They did not bother to
ask how Britain had attained th[e] position [of ‘workshop of the world’], while they con-
veniently ignored the ongoing system of national power – the British Empire – that . . . con-
tinued to support Britain’s position. (Lazonick 1991, 2,3 and 5)
No wonder that List asserted that ‘the English were the greatest bullies and good-for-
nothing characters in Europe’ (List 1841, 386–387)!
Thus as emerging powers with their state capitalist models, outcompete established
Western economies in Africa and continue to expand their economic (and concomitantly,
political) footprint across Africa, a certain degree of reﬂexivity on the part of the West
and their own historical trajectories should be in order, particularly if the critique hinges
on the ‘immorality’ of state capitalism versus the virtues of the ‘free market’.
However, where does that leave Africa? Thus far, the state capitalist model has granted
emerging economies – and a number of mineral-rich African countries – accelerated rates
of capital accumulation. Yet obviously, this milieu does not necessarily serve the interests of
the larger part of the populations of late developing countries. As the latest Africa progress
report noted:
Extreme disparities in income are slowing the pace of poverty reduction and hampering the
development of broad-based economic growth. Disparities in basic life-chances – for health,
education and participation in society – are preventing millions of Africans from realising
their potential, holding back social and economic progress in the process. Growing inequality
and the twin problems of marginalisation and disenfranchisement are threatening the conti-
nent’s prospects and undermining the very foundations of its recent success. (Africa Progress
Panel 2012, 4)
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That the report can comment on ‘growing inequality and the twin problems of marginalisa-
tion and disenfranchisement’, whilst still asserting Africa’s ‘recent success’ speaks
volumes. Success for whom? Policies need to be applied in ways that beneﬁt Africa’s
poor, given that ‘development [is] meaningful only in so far as it integrates the masses
and serves their interest’ (Amin 1974, 16). As Selwyn (2009, 157) remarks, they need to
be integrated into social development programmes, ‘and should be conceptualised not as
policies to stabilise capitalism in the long term, but as part of a movement towards
socialising the economy under democratic control’. State capitalism as exported to
Africa serves the class interests of externally oriented fractions with aspirations to
become internationally competitive, accumulate mega-proﬁts and entrench their domestic
positions. They are not somehow more ethical or worker-friendly simply because they
emanate from the South.
The Indian political economist Amit Bhaduri (2010, 42) argues that a sort of ‘develop-
mental terrorism’ dominates current economic thinking, deﬁned as ‘violence perpetrated on
the poor in the name of development by the state primarily in the interest of a corporate
aristocracy, approved by the IMF and the World Bank, and a self-serving political class’.
This is signiﬁcant if one seeks to draw out any ‘progressive’ elements from state capitalism.
According to Bhaduri (2010, 45–46), three different variants of the neoliberal growth
model which is central to the hegemonic economic order can be identiﬁed. Firstly:
. . . some countries with signiﬁcant deposits of valuable natural resources like oil enter into an
implicit political arrangement with the United States (and increasingly with China). They
ensure the supply of oil, receive petrodollars in return and recycle them through multinational
banks to engage multinational corporations for the development and modernisation of their
economies.
In the second variant, ‘massive commercial borrowing from international banks is done by
willing national governments for the purpose of development. This is encouraged and
usually coordinated by the IMF and the World Bank.’ The third variant, which is what con-
cerns us here ‘injects a strong element of statism in the developmental process’:
In this case, state-led or state-sponsored corporations are created and nurtured to compete with
multinationals under active government support, especially in the world market. At the same
time the government tries to attract direct foreign investment, either through these corporations,
or in areas where the government corporations are not the preferred option for some reason.
Nevertheless, the government becomes a ruthless promoter of the corporate entities in
search of higher growth.
However, as Bhaduri cautions, ‘the reliance on developmental terrorism by the state on
behalf of the corporations is not any less in this third variant of development, and a
dictatorial form of government ﬁts it rather naturally’ (ibid., 46). Such realities means
that state capitalism should not be confused as being vaguely progressive, even if
neoliberalism is (justiﬁably) critiqued in the process. This is particularly so given the rapa-
cious and exploitative nature of the oil industry. Until the situation changes, the role of
emerging powers practising state capitalism in the ‘recent success’ of Africa will remain
problematic.
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Note
1. Obviously, varieties exist. Mao provided an analysis of state capitalism ‘of a new type’ in his
comments on China in the immediate post-liberation phase, arguing that ‘a share of the proﬁts
produced by the workers goes to the capitalists, but that is only a small part, about one
quarter, of the total. The remaining three quarters are produced for the workers (in the form of
the welfare fund), for the state (in the form of income tax) and for expanding productive capacity
(a small part of which produces proﬁts for the capitalists). Therefore, this state-capitalist economy
of a new type takes on a socialist character to a very great extent and beneﬁts the workers and the
state’ (Mao 1977, 101).
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